Is there another state besides existence and nonexistence? Ask Question. Asked 2 years, 7 months ago. Active 2 years, 6 months ago. Viewed times. Improve this question. If we "can only see those two" Why bother himself with questions that are not unanswerable but "un-askable"?
There is, and we can see it even from our human perspective. That which makes it impossible to enter the same river twice, as Heraclitus pointed out. Plato called it becoming , not yet being but already not non-being. But the transformative state doesn't apply to God, because God is eternal. So God is the force that causes all transformations from nonexistence to existence, back to nonexistence again.
Add a comment. Active Oldest Votes. The "joke" refers to the precise meaning of the verb " existing" in medieval philosophy.
Improve this answer. Subsistence Meinong's concept of 'subsistence' is relevant here. The following is a brief explication: According to Meinong's Possibility There is the view of the possibilists. Community Bot 1. This view is called non-dualism. If you google you'll be snowed under.
William Pennat William Pennat 4 4 bronze badges. Yes, the Aristotelian concepts of potentiality dynamis and actuality entelecheia or energeia map nicely to what you describe and Heisenberg in his paper "Philosophie und Physik" has argued for a resurrection of exactly these categories to get a better grasp of quantum mechanics - a more fruitful line of enquiry IMO then the many-worlds interpretation which transfers the modal realism of Lewis into physics instead Sign up or log in Sign up using Google.
Sign up using Facebook. Sign up using Email and Password. Post as a guest Name. For discussion, see [Bach , ], [Kroon ], and [Lewis ]. So these descriptions seem to survive the semantic argument presented in the previous paragraph. But they face another objection, also facing simpler versions of descriptivism: Namely, the modal objection [Kripke ].
So these versions of descriptivism seem to escape the problems discussed in the previous paragraphs. The first two candidates, however, do not hold much promise for solving the problem of apparently true singular negative existentials.
We know what the property of being identical to Bill Gates is, but only because we know the result of plugging up one of the relata in the two-place relation is identical to with the individual Bill Gates. Insofar as we think that reality does not include any entity identical to Ronald McDonald, however, we are then left to wonder what the property of being identical to Ronald McDonald is. Similar considerations apply to the predicating view. The last candidates, rigidified metalinguistic and causal descriptions, are the most promising for a robust form of descriptivism.
But some have claimed to discern important differences in the functioning of a name and its alleged semantically equivalent rigidified description, of any flavor. That is because it is only Bill Gates that satisfies that condition and he is not a member of the domain of the possible world in question.
So, differences in how a name and a rigidified description embed under modal operators can still be discerned. See [Salmon ] for further discussion. This objection assumes that the domain of quantification varies from world to world and that individuals that serve as the designation of ordinary names are genuine contingent existents, theses that can be denied.
The objection also assumes that the range of the description is the domain of the world with respect to which the description is being evaluated, the actuality operator rigidifying only the condition of the description, which may also be denied.
The second objection to rigidified descriptivism concerns the differences some have claimed between how names and rigidified descriptions embed under propositional attitude verbs. Intuitively, Jones would have still believed that Bill Gates is wealthy even if things had been ever so slightly different than they actually are—say, I bought a poppy bagel instead of a sesame bagel this morning.
But it is implausible that Jones would have a belief about another possible world. See [Soames ]. This section examined the thesis that seemingly singular existential and negative existential sentences are really general existentials, which are then treated as ascribing the property of being instantiated or not instantiated to some property.
The success of that proposal, however, was seen to rest on the claim that ordinary proper names have descriptive equivalences, which many philosophers of language reject.
In part on the basis of the above discussed problems, many philosophers reject descriptivism and accept that ordinary proper names are devices of direct reference, that there are true genuinely singular negative existentials, and so that there are nonexistent objects.
The Meinongian embraces these appearances and concludes that reality includes referents for empty names and those referents do not exist. The Meinongian trades logical and semantic simplicity for metaphysical abundance. Meinongianism is the thesis that there are objects that do not exist and so included in the most unrestricted domain of quantification and discourse are nonexistent entities.
One immediate challenge for the Meinongian is to offer individuating conditions for nonexistents. The most straightforward comprehension principle is the naive principle that, for any condition on objects, there is a unique object satisfying exactly that condition. For our purposes, we can conceive of a condition as determining a set of properties; crudely, the properties expressed by the predicates composing the condition.
It follows that corresponding to any set of properties, there is exactly one object with exactly those properties. The naive comprehension principle faces several problems. In what remains of this section, we shall present these problems and distinguish different versions of Meinongianism in terms of the devices employed to develop a restricted comprehension principle for objects that avoids those problems. For a discussion of the debate between Russell and Meinong, see [Smith ].
The first is the problem of incomplete objects. Conditions need not be total; that is, we do not require that the set of properties a condition determines is such that, for every property, either it or its complement is a member of that set. So, by the naive comprehension principle, the condition of being a singer defines an object with exactly that property—being a singer—and no other properties.
A set with other properties as well is a distinct set of properties and so corresponds to a different condition and hence a different object. Some find incomplete objects problematic in themselves, as they are counterexamples to bivalence: Our singer, for example, has neither the property of wearing a dress nor the property of not wearing a dress.
But they also lead to more general threats of paradox. Our singer is an object with exactly one property: That of being a singer. This is its sole defining characteristic. So having a exactly one property is also a property of our singer and that property is distinct from the property of being a singer, which our singer also has. So, the singer has two properties. One simple solution is to restrict the comprehension principle to total conditions.
The resulting proposal, however, leads to a questionable application of Meinongian metaphysics to problems of fictional truth, as many want to claim that there is simply no fact of the matter as to whether or not Sherlock Holmes has a mole on his left shoulder, as that is left underdetermined by the Holmes stories and there are no deeper grounds for either predication.
Relatedly, this solution undermines a primary motivation for Meinongianism—namely, the idea that there is a subject of predication corresponding to any object of thought, as we certainly do not think only of complete objects. So, the simple solution is too simple and the Meinongian is better to find another, more complex solution to the problems of incompleteness. The second is the problem of contradiction.
A naive comprehension principle generates objects that violate the principle of noncontradiction. Consider the condition of being taller than everything.
By the naive comprehension principle, this condition determines an object and so there is an object that has exactly the property of being taller than everything. But then it is taller than itself, which is a contradiction given the irreflexivity of the taller than relation.
The irreflexivity of the taller than relation is nonlogical. It is a logical truth that everything is self-identical; i. But consider the property of being self-distinct.
By the naive comprehension principle this condition determines an object and that object is self-distinct. So our logically true sentence has a counterinstance. So, consider the condition of being winged, being a horse, and existing. By the naive comprehension principle, there is an object with exactly these features.
But then this object exists, as existing is one of its characterizing features. Intuitively, however, there is no existent winged horse. An existent object cannot so easily be thought into being. Indeed, for every intuitively nonexistent object that motivates Meinongianism—Zeus, Pegasus, Santa Clause, and Ronald McDonald—there is, by the naive abstraction principle, an object just like it but with the additional property of existing.
But then there is an existing Zeus, an existing Pegasus, etc.. This is overpopulation not of being but of existence as well. The naive comprehension principle, then, must be rejected and a restricted principle connecting sets of properties with objects be put in its place. The principle should generate enough objects to serve the Meinongian purpose of ensuring a corresponding object for every thought while avoiding the problems discussed above.
The first distinguishes two kinds of properties, what, following Terence Parsons [Parsons , ], we shall call nuclear and extra-nuclear properties. The comprehension principle is then restricted to conditions involving only nuclear predicates.
Problematic properties, like existing, etc. Nuclear, not extra-nuclear, properties individuate objects. For every condition, there is a unique object that encodes just those properties. An object may or may not exemplify the properties it encodes. Sherlock Holmes encodes the properties of being a detective and living at B Baker Street, etc. The properties an object exemplify are not, on this view, a matter of mere stipulation.
How do these distinctions solve the problems raised above for the naive comprehension principle? Parsons focuses on the problems of contradiction and of the existent winged horse. Meinong claimed that there is a round square, but that, complained Russell, leads to violations of the principle of noncontradiction, as that entity is then both round and not round, in light of the fact that it is square, which entails that it is not round.
He claims that there are counterexamples to the claim that all square objects are not round; after all, the round square is a square object that is round!
This solution, however, does not seem to solve the more general threat of contradiction, as discussed above. Indeed, Parsons himself recognizes the limited success of his response see [Parsons, , 42n8].
He allows that being non-squared is a nuclear property. But then his comprehension principle entails that there is an object corresponding to the condition of being a non-squared square, where that object instantiates the incompatible properties of being a square and being a non-square.
The threat of contradiction has not been silenced. The naive comprehension principle faced the problem of generating an existent winged horse.
Recall our singer from above. That object does not have exactly one property; instead, it has exactly one nuclear property. The distinction between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties remains unclear. He then tells us that the extra-nuclear are those that do not stand for properties of individuals [Parsons , 24].
And, of course, it is nuclear and not extra-nuclear properties by which objects are individuated. But it is not clear what status individual identity properties—properties like being identical to A , where A is an individual substance like, say, Parsons himself—have with respect to this distinction.
He sometimes claims that they are extra-nuclear properties [Parsons , 28]. In that case, however, Parsons is committed to the problematic thesis of the identity of indiscernibles and so the impossibility of two primitively distinct but qualitatively identical objects.
For further discussion, see the entry on the identity of indiscernibles. Many contemporary philosophers agree that objects are not individuated qualitatively, their identity and diversity being primitive. For Parsons to accept this, he needs to include individual identity properties among the nuclear properties. Furthermore, it is hard to see why identity properties are not properties of individuals. Then the nuclear negations of those properties are also nuclear. Then there is an object that is distinct from every object that there is, which is a contradiction.
It is unclear, then, that the distinction between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties and the restriction of the comprehension principle to nuclear properties solves the problems facing the naive comprehension principle. Earlier we distinguished between two versions of sophisticated Meinongianism. The first, based on the distinction between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties, was found lacking.
Whereas Parsons distinguished different kinds of properties, restricting the comprehension principle to only nuclear properties in the hope of thereby avoiding the problems plaguing the naive comprehension principle, Zalta distinguishes two different modes of having a property for the same effect.
Exemplifying a property is the familiar way in which an individual has a property; it is roughly what most metaphysicians have in mind when the speak of instantiating a property. Obama exemplifies humanity, my chair exemplifies being comfortable, and the fig tree in my backyard exemplifies needing water. What the comprehension principle does is say not what properties object exemplify, in this sense, but rather what properties they encode.
So, for any condition C on properties, there is an object that encodes exactly those properties, which leaves open whether or not those objects also exemplify those properties.
How does this distinction solve the problems facing Meinongianism presented earlier in this section? By the comprehension principle, the condition of being a singer determines an object with exactly that property. But the comprehension principle does not imply that that object exemplifies the property of being a singer but rather that it encodes that property.
Exemplifying the property of being a singer requires exemplifying other properties like having a spatial location, having a voice box, etc. But the object can encode the property of being a singer without encoding these further properties.
The singer does exemplify some properties, such as the property of being abstract. The singer encodes the property of being a singer, does not encode the property of being abstract, and exemplifies multiple properties, including the property of being abstract, being the topic of this paragraph, and not being a singer. This is not contradictory given the fundamental difference between encoding and exemplifying.
Insofar as the set of properties characterizing an object are not complete, the resulting object will be incomplete with respect to the properties it encodes. But it need not be incomplete with respect to the properties it exemplifies.
While our singer encodes neither the property of wearing blue shoes nor the property of not wearing blue shoes, we can say that it exemplifies the property of not wearing blue shoes. Bi-valence is saved, at least with respect to exemplification.
Restricting the comprehension principle to the properties encoded and rejecting an easy transfer between properties encoded and properties exemplified also promises to avoid the other threats of contradiction presented above.
Recall the logically impossible condition of being self-distinct. The principle of noncontradiction concerns the properties objects exemplify, not the properties objects encode assuming our Meinongian is going to account for impossible objects. Because an object can encode inconsistent properties without exemplifying them, impossible objects do not violate the principle of noncontradiction.
There is an object correlated to the condition of being an existent winged horse, but that object encodes and does not exemplify the property of existing. Being existent can characterize an object without that object exemplifying existence. So we do not need to worry about an overpopulation of existent beings, as existent beings exemplify existence, which the existent winged horse does not.
The semantics and logic is straightforward and simple and surface forms of the natural language sentences of interest in this article match their deep logical forms. But the ontological costs are evident. There is semantic and logical simplicity at a metaphysical price. For more on Meingianism, in addition to the references earlier in this section, see the following: [Barz ], [Berto ], [Berto and Priest ], [Findlay ], [Griffin ], [Jacquette , ], [Lambert ], [Landini ], [Lewis ],[Priest ],[Rapaport , ,,], [Routley , , ], [Voltolini , ], [Zalta , ,,].
The previous two sections discussed views that deny that existence is a property of individuals and views that deny that existence is a universal property. This section considers views according to which existence is a universal property of individuals, in the hope of reaping the benefits of both the earlier views. It then explores the interaction between quantifiers, tense operators, modal operators, and a universal, first-order existence predicate in an attempt to expose some difficulties such a view faces.
Olson suggests that not only are these implications wildly counterintuitive; they also show that the Epicurean view fails to be a significant view about death in particular. Is it possible, and prudent, to make oneself invulnerable to death—to ensure that death will not be able to harm one?
This issue is discussed in the contributions by Stephen Hetherington and Steven Luper. An obvious way to achieve such invulnerability would be to arrange things so that continued life could contain nothing but misery; clearly, however, that course of action has little to recommend it.
When ataraxia has arrived, the person is ready for death, and cannot be harmed by it. In the typical case, of course, death comes before the person has attained ataraxia. But, Hetherington argues, while such a death is premature, this does not imply that it is harmful: The harm we tend to attribute to it is more properly ascribed to the regrettable way in which the person was leading her life. Hetherington also discusses the epistemological question of how a person could know that her death will not be premature.
According to what Luper regards as the strongest argument for the perfectionist thesis, the only things that are good for a person are achieving her life plan and the individual aims that make up this plan; and since these achievements can be attained fairly early on in her life, she can perfect life long before she dies.
Luper thinks, however, that this argument must be rejected after all, primarily because things outside our life plans can be good for us. In this book, Benatar argues that coming into existence is always harmful and that it is always morally wrong to procreate.
He puts forward two main arguments for this position. The first is that there is a crucial asymmetry between harms and benefits illustrated by pains and pleasures, though Benatar stresses that analogous points hold for other harms and benefits. Whereas the presence of pain is bad and the presence of pleasure is good, the absence of pain is good even if there is no one who enjoys it, but the absence of pleasure is not bad unless someone is deprived of this pleasure.
Benatar argues that given his asymmetry claim, while non-existence has one advantage over existence absence of pain is better than presence of pain , existence has no advantage over non-existence presence of pleasure is not better than non-deprivational absence of pleasure.
Existence is therefore always worse than non-existence. In particular, various psychological mechanisms lead us to neglect the vast amounts of bad things in our lives; in reality, our lives are much worse than we believe. He also responds to the charge that his view commits him to a favorable attitude towards suicide and speciecide. You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar.
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