But under President Maduro, Venezuela's economy collapsed. Shortages of basic supplies became widespread, prompting more than 5. In December , opposition parties won a majority in the National Assembly, and the legislature became a thorn in President Maduro's side. Mr Maduro was re-elected in but the poll was widely dismissed as rigged.
Mr Maduro has remained in the presidential palace and in charge of the country. Most of the opposition parties boycotted legislative elections held in December and as a result, a coalition led by Mr Maduro's PSUV party won a majority of the seats in the National Assembly.
He and his fellow opposition lawmakers argue that until free elections are held, their assembly is the only legitimate institution in Venezuela. Venezuela opposition figure Guevara arrested. UN to feed crisis-hit Venezuelan schoolchildren. On March 8, , the U. Colombia hosts 1. Although Colombia officially closed its border with Venezuela in March , this has only increased the danger while doing little to nothing to stop the flood of people leaving Venezuela.
When Colombia reopens its border to Venezuelans on July 1, 2o21 , it is suspected that the e xodus is expected to increase substantially. Instead of crossing at official points, the lack of options forces people to use illegal border crossings where they are subject to extortion demands by border gangs.
There are reports that the presence of the military and the armed insurgents has resulted in raids on family homes, death threats and assaults by military and police, along with many other human rights abuses. As a result, more people are fleeing across the closed border in dangerous ways by using illegal routes and human smugglers. For those remaining in Venezuela, it is becoming more and more challenging to get the necessities of life, and some people are going to extreme lengths to survive.
Some Venezuelan women and girls are traveling hours or days to cross the border into Colombia to earn money as sex workers. These fuel shortages, along with shortages of natural gas, electricity and clean water were all caused by a lack of infrastructure maintenance.
While it has not been confirmed who the supplier was or if they received permission from the U. Fuel has been strictly rationed in the country since the last delivery in November The Venezuelan economy has shrunk significantly over the past six years.
When Maduro first assumed power in , the gross domestic produce GDP was increasing at a rate of 1. According to oilprice. The country is seeing between and 1, cases a day. Early in the pandemic, gas shortages helped prevent the spread because it was hard for people to travel. However, the number of confirmed cases is likely a significant underestimate as a result of limited testing and reporting.
As of Sept. On Sept. Pregnant women and people in impoverished parts of the country are also more vulnerable to malnutrition. Needs related to COVID have also been downplayed, and official figures do not portray the actual situation, preventing people from accessing adequate health assistance.
Access to aid is hampered by widespread fuel shortages, blackouts, and insecurity. Clashes between Colombian armed groups and Venezuelan armed forces have displaced thousands of Venezuelans and limited their access to services and aid.
Humanitarian aid is often politicised; since December , there has been an increase in harassment and intimidation of civil society groups, NGOs, human rights organisations, and media outlets by the Government. This includes freezing bank accounts and other banking restrictions such as constant monitoring of transactions , arrest warrants, raiding offices, and detaining members of these organisations.
National NGOs face bureaucratic restrictions in registering and updating registration, which causes months of delays in their activities. Humanitarian organisations also face severe physical and logistical challenges, including fuel shortages that hinder the implementation of activities even after obtaining the necessary permits to operate.
Land borders remain closed because of COVID, which largely prevents people from seeking assistance in neighbouring countries or forces them to cross borders irregularly. In April , the World Food Programme WFP reached a deal with Venezuela to supply food to , children — mostly those with special needs and those too young to go to school.
This is the first step in a multi-year plan to help reduce the rate of child malnutrition that will see the number of children receiving food increase to 1. WFP estimates that 7. This is nearly 10 million people. Mejia, executive director of Oxfam Colombia. He said the four weeks before the webinar had seen many migrants who had transited Colombia en route to Peru and Chile returning to Colombia; some had also returned to Venezuela.
These migrants perceived the opportunities to be better in Venezuela and Colombia than in Peru and Chile, where there are increasing restrictions on migrants from Venezuela. Inside the country, the humanitarian situation is deteriorating rapidly. The regime is enforcing a quarantine despite the fact that many residents do not have access to electricity, running water, or gas. Fuel shortages have caused additional suffering. Just as many Venezuelans are going hungry, farmers are leaving their crops to rot in the fields because there is no gasoline to transport produce to urban centers.
At the same time, a recent survey revealed that 70 percent of health workers were forced to miss at least one day of work in the last week of March because they did not have gasoline. The economic and humanitarian situation continues to worsen as the Maduro regime becomes more repressive, inching further toward criminal activities and violating human rights.
This year is no exception. Externally, the status quo scenario will ensue if Maduro finds enough international support to scrape by. For example, Russia—through its new state-owned entity— would need to successfully replace Rosneft as the vehicle through which the Maduro regime circumvents U.
Additionally, other allies will need to continue propping up the Maduro regime, as Iran recently did when it supplied the regime with materials and technicians to restart a refinery. Internally, the status quo will also remain so long as Maduro can repress and intimidate the opposition, using the Covid pandemic as an excuse for a crackdown on political dissent. Covid is a critical political factor for the opposition, which is now unable to organize mass protests and has once again splintered on whether or not to negotiate with the regime.
That being said, the pandemic may provide an opportunity for Venezuelan opposition forces to rebuild their unity and establish credibility. The status quo is more likely to continue if Maduro successfully stifles these efforts, or if the interim government is unable to maintain its credibility and implement these plans transparently.
The Maduro regime is adept at using negotiation efforts to buy time and quell international pressure. While dialogue efforts falter, the country will spiral further into crisis, and the Maduro regime will continue addressing the pandemic by spreading disinformation, attacking the press, and cracking down on political opponents.
Internally, this scenario is conditioned on a certain level of splintering within both political camps. Some elements of the opposition will be willing to negotiate, perhaps believing that outcomes will be different this time, or out of desperation if the situation becomes even more precarious amid crumbling infrastructure, repression, and shortages. At the same time, if this scenario occurs, then it is likely that at least some elements of the regime have begun recognizing that Maduro has to go, prompting Maduro and his inner circle to appease these elements by pretending to negotiate.
This scenario depends on external drivers as well. The international community is eager to facilitate a democratic transition. As the humanitarian situation worsens due to Covid and internal factors, countries that hope to bring about a peaceful transition may end up attempting one more time to mediate dialogue between the Maduro regime and the opposition.
In doing so, mediating countries may risk giving the Maduro regime a veneer of legitimacy or more time to stay in power.
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